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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ON THE RIGHT: LESSONS
FROM THE TEA PARTY 
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the legal academy over the past decade or so, popular consti-
tutionalism has emerged as an important and often quite controversial 
theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of constitutional 
development.1 In its strongest and most provocative form, popular consti-
tutionalism demands that the American people play a central role in in-
terpreting the meaning of the Constitution, and that the courts should, to 
one degree or another, defer to the legitimate constitutional claims of the 
people and their elected representatives. The Supreme Court is not (or 
should not be) the final arbiter of constitutional meaning.2 Ordinary citi-
zens should regularly engage with their Constitution, and they should do 
so not just in some abstract sense, but in an immediate and active way.3 
Popular constitutionalism, in short, is based on the belief that responsibil-
ity for shaping the meaning of the Constitution is not just the province of 
the courts; it is also a basic duty of the people themselves. 
History provides a rich canvas for exploring the record and potential 
of popular constitutionalism. Much of the work produced by scholars of 
popular constitutionalism has been efforts to excavate past moments of 
popular mobilization around constitutional claims. They have examined 
episodes of U.S. history, identifying ways in which popular demands 
made upon constitutional text and principles resulted in shifts in general 
† Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty Fellow, American Bar Foun-
dation. For helpful comments, criticisms, and discussions, I thank Kathy Baker, Chris Buccafusco, 
Sarah Harding, Mark Rosen, as well as participants in the University of Colorado Law School’s 
Rothgerber Conference, and the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop. 
1. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
959, 960 (2004) (describing the popular constitutionalism as an “emerging new discourse” within the 
legal academy); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2047, 2048 n.1 (2010) (citing sources describing popularity of popular constitutionalism 
among legal academics). 
2. This normatively oriented version of popular constitutionalism is found most prominently 
in the work of Larry Kramer. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 
2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (2001); see also, e.g., MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW 
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). 
3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 959 (“In a system of popular constitutionalism, the role of the 
people is not confined to occasional acts of constitution making, but includes active and ongoing 
control over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law.”). 
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assumptions and expectations about the Constitution.4 This, in turn, pres-
sured those in positions of official authority—most notably but not ex-
clusively judges—toward new interpretations of the Constitution. Popu-
lar constitutionalism thus offers a response to the tension inherent in de-
mocratic constitutionalism: between a commitment to popular sover-
eignty and a commitment to constitutionally entrenched norms that stand 
above majoritarian decision-making. Through this dynamic of constitu-
tional responsiveness, both the Constitution and the courts benefit. A 
constitutional system that is responsive to the constitutional commit-
ments of the people serves a crucial legitimating function.5 
While American history reveals a robust tradition of popular consti-
tutional engagement, popular constitutionalists generally see develop-
ments of recent years as reasons for concern. Larry Kramer, whose book 
The People Themselves is the single most prominent contribution to the 
field of popular constitutionalism, laments that Americans no longer take 
seriously their responsibility as interpreters of the Constitution.6 The 
people have become too deferential to the courts; they have lost a sense 
of authority over their founding document.7 In accepting judicial claims 
of primacy over interpreting the Constitution, the people themselves have 
abdicated a basic duty of constitutional citizenship.8  
The modern judiciary—particularly the Supreme Court of recent 
years—is also to blame for the decline of popular constitutional engage-
ment. Advocates of popular constitutionalism have attacked the Court’s 
efforts to assert a preeminent, even exclusive role in defining the mean-
ing of the Constitution for all of American society.9 By Kramer’s ac-
4. The bulk of Kramer’s book is a close reading of the practice of extrajudicial constitution
claim-making and judicial review in the early republic. KRAMER, supra note 2 passim; see also Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 
(2006); William E. Forbath, Popular Constitution in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark 
Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in 
Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967 (2006); William E. For-
bath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); Hendrik Hartog, The Constitu-
tion of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All”, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987); Robert 
Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 1027 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism]; Robert C. Post & Reva 
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and 
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection]; Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
5. On this point, the work of Post and Siegel is essential. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). 
6. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 227-48. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Recent cases in which the Court has emphasized its exclusive interpretive supremacy on 
questions of constitutional interpretation include Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 428 
(2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 524 (1997); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (“Where, in the per-
formance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of in-
tensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a 
dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever 
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count, the Court’s repeated claims that it is supreme in defining the 
meaning of the Constitution, coupled with widespread popular accep-
tance of these claims, from both left and right, caused “popular constitu-
tionalism [to] fade[] from view” in the post-New Deal period.10 Popular 
constitutionalists have called for increased popular engagement with the 
nation’s founding document as an antidote to the problem of judicial 
supremacy.11 
As if made to order, we are today witnessing in the Tea Party a po-
litical movement that has, to an extent unprecedented in modern Ameri-
can history, placed the Constitution at the center of its reform agenda. 
This movement has done so with remarkably little concern for the courts 
and judicial interpretations of the Constitution. As I explain below, Tea 
Party constitutionalism is premised on a belief that citizens have a re-
sponsibility to read their Constitution, to stake out claims about its mean-
ing, and to demand that public officials act in accordance with these 
claims. The Tea Party, it would seem, is precisely the kind of popular 
assertion of responsibility over the Constitution that popular constitu-
tionalists had been calling for. 
But the Tea Party has hardly been embraced by advocates of popu-
lar constitutionalism. The reason is not hard to discern. Although as a 
formal matter, the theory of popular constitutionalism has no ideological 
or partisan valence, it has for the most part been advocated by liberals 
and progressives. It has generally been framed as a critique of recent 
Supreme Court decisions, particularly those that have served conserva-
tive interests.12 The underlying assumption behind much of the scholar-
ship on popular constitutionalism is that the Supreme Court, at least in 
recent years and perhaps as a general rule, is more conservative than the 
populace.13 Therefore a more democratically responsive constitutional 
system, a system in which popular claims on the Constitution play a 
larger role, would generally serve the causes of most concern for liberals 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to 
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”). The semi-
nal articulation of this principle, prominently referenced in all these recent cases, is Cooper v. Aaron. 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming the Supreme Court to be “supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution”). 
10. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 223. 
11. See, e.g., id. at 228–32. 
12. Much of the momentum for popular constitutionalism as a scholarly movement derived 
from (1) the Rehnquist Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), see, e.g., KRAMER, 
supra note 2, at 231; Kramer, supra note 2, at 153; and (2) the Rehnquist Court’s limitations on 
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases such as Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7; Kimel 
v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637–38 (1999); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 
524; see, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: 
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, 
Juricentric Restrictions]; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 441–42. 
13. Kramer, supra note 2, at 130–31. 
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and progressives—most notably the promotion of various human rights 
causes.14  
So the Tea Party’s emergence presents something of a dilemma. 
Here we have a movement that seems to be doing much of what popular 
constitutionalists have been calling for. It is claiming independent inter-
pretive authority over the Constitution. It is finding ways in which to act 
upon its constitutional claims that do not depend upon the courts. Yet the 
central claim on the Constitution that the Tea Party has embraced is a 
commitment to sharply limited government. The Tea Party vision of the 
Constitution is in direct opposition to the idea of the Constitution as a 
vehicle for the protection of civil rights and social welfare rights that has 
been at the heart of the popular constitutional project within the legal 
academy. If this is popular constitutionalism, might it require a reconsid-
eration of some of the assumptions that have driven scholarship on popu-
lar constitutionalism? 
In this Article, I consider the lessons that the Tea Party offers for 
scholars of popular constitutionalism. Specifically, I argue that the expe-
rience of the Tea Party should spark a reconsideration of some assump-
tions that tend to drive much of the interest in popular constitutionalism. 
Some who have embraced popular constitutionalism seem to assume that 
popular constitutional mobilization is a vehicle particularly well suited 
for advancing progressive constitutional claims. Alternately, some have 
assumed that popular constitutionalism has no particular ideological or 
partisan valence—that it is basically a neutral vehicle for advancing con-
stitution claims of all kinds. But the lessons of the Tea Party might re-
quire a rethinking of these assumptions. The Tea Party has shown that, at 
least on the modern American scene, popular constitutional mobilization 
is particularly effective at advancing causes much closer to the heart of 
the conservative or libertarian agenda. Part of the explanation for this has 
to do with the nature of constitutionalism as well as cultural assumptions 
prevalent in recent American history. But, more importantly, it has to do 
  
 14. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 181 (defining “populist constitutionalism” as centered 
on the promotion of human rights);  
In a recent string of decisions invalidating federal civil rights legislation, the Supreme 
Court has repeated the simple but powerful message: ‘The Constitution belongs to the 
courts’. . . . These decisions break with the judicial practice of the last half century, when 
the Court employed doctrines of deference to vindicate democratic values in constitu-
tional interpretation, defining the scope of federal power in terms that gave great weight 
to Congress’s judgments about the nation’s needs and interests. No longer does the Court 
emphasize the respect due to the constitutional judgments of a coequal and democrati-
cally elected branch of government. Now it claims that only the judiciary can define the 
meaning of the Constitution. 
Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12, at 1. Most of the historically oriented works 
on popular constitutionalism have focused on moments in which popular movements advocated for 
the expansion of federal authority in the name of promoting social welfare and civil rights. See 
KRAMER, supra note 2, at 220; cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should 
Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 887 (2005) (suggesting that “Kramer sees popular constitu-
tionalism only when he approves of the cause”). 
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with the mechanism available for popular constitutional mobilization. 
These mechanisms serve certain causes better than others, and they serve 
demands for less government regulation particularly well. This, I sug-
gest, has been the central lesson of the Tea Party for popular constitu-
tionalism. 
In Part I of this Article, I examine the basic project of popular con-
stitutionalism, including its normative implications. I explore the chal-
lenges popular constitutionalists have had in defining their central con-
cept, and I offer a working definition of popular constitutionalism that 
identifies what is unique about efforts of constitutional mobilization (as 
differentiated from social movements that lead to constitutional change). 
Part II describes the basic tenets of Tea Party constitutionalism. Here I 
explore the substance of the Tea Party’s constitutional vision, the strate-
gies of constitutional interpretation the Tea Party has embraced, and the 
predominantly extrajudicial processes by which the Tea Party has sought 
to advance its reading of the Constitution. Part III then considers whether 
popular constitutionalism advances certain claims on the Constitution 
better than others. Drawing on the lessons of the Tea Party, I look at 
those mechanisms that have proven particularly effective at mobilizing 
and advancing popular constitutional claims, and I question how differ-
ent kinds of claims might be advanced through these mechanisms. I sug-
gest that there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that popular 
constitutionalism may be most effective when it is used to advance a 
conservative-libertarian agenda, such as that of the Tea Party.  
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM DEFINED 
A. The Fundamentals of Popular Constitutionalism 
The great contribution of popular constitutionalism scholarship has 
been to draw our attention to the ideas and commitments of extrajudicial 
actors on questions of constitutional meaning. By challenging the idea 
that the Supreme Court is the only—or even the preeminent—
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, popular constitutionalism 
provides a more accurate description of American constitutional devel-
opment. This is popular constitutionalism as a descriptive claim. 
There is also a normative component to much of popular constitu-
tional scholarship. For some popular constitutionalists, a better apprecia-
tion of the importance of the constitutional commitments of the Ameri-
can people and a more skeptical attitude toward the idea of judicial inter-
pretive supremacy points toward an alternative framework for arguing 
how the constitutional system should work. Extrajudicial inputs are not 
only a fact of life in the American constitutional system, but, according 
to some advocates of popular constitutionalism, we are better off because 
of it. We should encourage more popular engagement with the Constitu-
tion and its history. Taking this one step further (and here is the most 
controversial element of popular constitutionalism), some advocates of 
528 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:3 
popular constitutionalism argue that the courts should do more to recog-
nize and respect extrajudicial constitutional commitments, even when 
they diverge from judicially defined constitutional law.15 In this critique 
of judicial interpretive supremacy, popular constitutional scholarship 
points toward a normative theory of judicial decision-making. On ques-
tions of constitutional interpretation, judges should view themselves in a 
dialogue with the people and their elected representatives. Some scholars 
have gone so far as to suggest that the proper attitude of the courts should 
be one of deference to certain extrajudicial claims on the Constitution. 
B. A Working Definition of Popular Constitutionalism 
A central challenge in defining popular constitutionalism is to locate 
something distinctly “constitutional” about social movements that en-
gage in a variety of issues. Simply because a social movement claims 
that its agenda is supported or inspired by the Constitution or by constitu-
tional principles cannot be enough to turn a social movement into a 
popular constitutional movement. Or, if this is enough, then the concept 
of popular constitutionalism has little to no analytical utility.  
Drawing on the work of several leading scholars in the field, in this 
section I offer a working definition of popular constitutionalism. My goal 
here is not to come up with a categorical framework that conclusively 
identifies one movement as being properly a popular constitutional 
movement and another as outside the definition.  Such an approach 
would be of limited utility. Rather, I undertake this definitional project so 
as to offer a framework by which we can compare different movements 
in terms most relevant to popular constitutional analysis. The concept, as 
I define it, is best understood as residing on a two-dimensional spectrum, 
with one axis representing the “popular” component of the movement, 
the other representing the “constitutional” component.  
The relative “popularity” of a constitutional movement does not ref-
erence its level of popular support. Rather, it looks at the movement’s 
relationship to the courts, particularly the Supreme Court. A movement 
that acts in ways that are largely autonomous from the courts and judicial 
doctrine would score highly on this scale. A movement that is more def-
erential to judicial interpretive authority on constitutional questions, such 
as a litigation-centered movement whose primary mission is to convince 
the Court to rule a certain way in a constitutional case, would score 
poorly. 
Understood this way, then, a basic component of popular constitu-
tionalism is some level of assumed interpretive autonomy from the judi-
ciary. While a broad-based campaign aimed specifically at convincing 
  
 15. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12; Post & Siegel, Equal 
Protection, supra note 4. 
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the justices of the Supreme Court to chart a new path of constitutional 
interpretation is a constitutional movement of a sort, it does not quite 
capture the essence of popular constitutionalism, at least as that concept 
has been developed over the past decade or so.16 For such an approach 
would seem to grant to the courts the interpretive authority that is rightly 
that of the activists. The critical actors in this scenario are lawyers and 
judges, not the people themselves. In contrast, popular constitutionalism, 
according to Kramer, “does not assume that authoritative legal interpreta-
tion can take place only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally 
valid process of interpretation can be undertaken in the political branches 
and by the community at large.”17 Kramer, for one, has dismissed the 
popular constitutional bona fides of most contenders to this label of the 
past fifty years because they tend to frame their constitutional arguments 
as challenges “directed at rather than against the Court.”18 
I would argue that popular constitutionalism must contain a self-
conscious move that is at the center of legal analysis: an effort to make a 
distinction between law from politics. Specifically, for purposes of defin-
ing a popular constitutional movement, an extrajudicial constitutional 
claim must include some effort to distinguish constitutionality from po-
litical or moral advisability—it must at least recognize the possibility that 
there is a difference between the decision of what makes good or just 
policy and the measure of a given policy’s constitutional status.19 In for-
mulating their visions of popular constitutionalism, both Mark Tushnet 
and Larry Kramer have identified some recognition of the law-politics 
  
 16. But see Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1029 (“In contrast to 
Kramer, we do not understand judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism to be mutually 
exclusive systems of constitutional ordering.”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 351 (2001) (“A look at 
our constitutional history suggests that judicial supremacy is, in important respects, a collaborative 
practice, involving the Court in partnerships with the representative branches and the People them-
selves.”). 
 17. Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, 
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006). 
 18. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 221; see also Kramer, supra note 17, at 698 n.3 (arguing that 
recent anti-abortion activism has accepted the principle of judicial supremacy because the state-level 
legislative restrictions on abortions these activists have advanced have been designed not as asser-
tions of “co-equal authority to say what the Constitution means,” but as a way to get the Court to 
revisit its prior holding in Roe). 
 19. A common criticism of the theory of popular constitutionalism is that it is impossible to 
distinguish it from social and political activism generally.  For example, James Fleming has written:  
All of Kramer’s historical examples of popular constitutionalism provide answers to the 
question of who may interpret—and involve rejection of claims that courts rather than 
other departments or the people themselves are the ultimate or exclusive interpreters of 
the Constitution. None of them gives us any idea of what is the content of the constitu-
tionalism in popular constitutionalism and how it binds and guides the people themselves. 
Thus, it is not clear that there is any particular content to popular constitutionalism that 
constrains the people themselves . . . . The upshot of all this is that it is not clear that there 
is a domain of popular constitutionalism as distinguished from the domains of ordinary 
politics and justice. 
James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously 
Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1392 (2005) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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divide as a necessary attribute of the concept.20 In Taking the Constitu-
tion Away from the Courts, Tushnet insisted that his version of popular 
constitutionalism (which he labeled “populist constitutional law”) must 
be understood as a legal concept.21  
The most problematic term here is law. How can constitution deci-
sions made away from the courts, particularly by ordinary citizens, be 
law? . . . [I]t is law because it is not in the first instance either the ex-
pression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression 
of unfiltered moral judgments.22  
Kramer further develops the point: “[P]opular constitutionalism is 
not mere politics, but is in fact a legal concept that treats the Constitution 
as ‘law’ in its proper sense.”23 The key distinction between law and poli-
tics is a sense that law “binds and limits” in ways that politics does not: 
“The law itself encumbers the field of available action.”24 The extent of 
this constraint is less important than a basic assumption “that applying 
law differs from doing politics because it includes constraints that do no 
exist in the political domain.”25 
If we put together these two necessary components of popular con-
stitutionalism—an assumption that constitutional principles function 
differently from policy and a measure of autonomy from the courts—
then it becomes clear that popular constitutionalism is best considered on 
a spectrum. This spectrum would have on one end an exclusively 
“juricentric”26 or “legal constitutionalist”27 or “catholic”28 approach to 
constitutional interpretation, which would include reform efforts aimed 
exclusively at constitutional litigation. On the other end would be popu-
lar constitutionalism in its purest form—popular movements that mobi-
lize around constitutional interpretations that either act as if the Supreme 
Court is irrelevant or act in direct opposition to existing constitutional 
  
 20. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at x–xi; Kramer, supra note 17, at 699. 
 21. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at x. 
 22. Id. at x–xi. Tushnet adds that while he identifies “populist constitutionalism” as a legal 
concept, it still “accords a large place for politics, in two senses: Populist constitutional law gains its 
content from discussions among the people in ordinary political forums, and political leaders play a 
significant role in assisting the people [who] conduct those discussions.” Id. at xi.  
 23. Kramer, supra note 17, at 699.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 699–700; see also KRAMER, supra note 2, at 30 (describing eighteenth-century 
constitutionalism, which serves as a model for Kramer’s concept of popular constitutionalism, as 
“self-consciously legal in nature,” albeit with a “notion of legality [that] was less rigid and more 
diffuse [than modern conceptions]—more will willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over compet-
ing plausible interpretations of the constitution, more willing to ascribe authority to an idea as unfo-
cused as ‘the people’”). 
 26. Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12, at 2 (“The juricentric Constitution 
imagines the judiciary as the exclusive guardian of the Constitution.”). 
 27. Kramer, supra note 17, at 699 (distinguishing “popular constitutionalism” from “legal 
constitutionalism,” defined as “the idea that constitutional interpretation has been turned over to the 
judiciary and, in particular, the Supreme Court”). 
 28. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27–30 (1988). 
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doctrine (with any modification of that doctrine only an incidental or 
secondary goal of the constitutional mobilization). 
II. TEA PARTY CONSTITUTIONALISM29 
Part II breaks down the elements of the Tea Party as a constitutional 
movement. I first offer a brief summary of the emergence of the Tea 
Party movement. Then I examine the core tenets of Tea Party constitu-
tionalism. I give particular attention to the ways in which the Tea Party’s 
ideas about how best to interpret the Constitution provide a platform for 
constitution mobilization. I then describe the major areas of activism and 
mobilization for the Tea Party’s constitutional project.  
A. The Emergence of the Tea Party Movement 
The Tea Party was born in early 2009, when a series of scattered 
rallies denouncing the Obama Administration’s stimulus program (a con-
tinuation and expansion of policy begun under the Bush Administration), 
coalesced into a loosely organized national movement flying the banner 
of the “Tea Party.”30 (This name always harkened back to the revolution-
ary protest against British authority, but in the early stages of the move-
ment some supporters also promoted it as an acronym for “Taxed 
Enough Already.”)  The Tea Party gained media attention with nation-
wide protest rallies on tax day, April 15, 2009.31 It was not clear at this 
point whether this was going to be a flash in the pan, a brief flurry of 
anger before people got back to their lives, or whether it had the potential 
for something more sustained.  
By the following summer, with the Tea Party still gaining adherents 
and energy, its potential political force was put on display when the 
movement aimed its attention on President Obama’s health care reform.32 
Local Tea Party groups, encouraged and guided by a number of national 
organizations that sought to capture and direct the energy of this growing 
movement, organized protests at town hall meetings members of Con-
gress were holding around the country to discuss the pending health care 
legislation.33 Health care provided a convenient and effective focal point 
for the second wave of Tea Party activism. When Congress went into its 
summer recess in August, many of its members held town hall meetings 
to talk to their constituents.34 Tea Party leaders targeted these meetings 
as a way for the Tea Party to get itself heard. As one leader explained in 
  
 29. The following section draws on material examined at considerably more lenth in Christo-
pher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. (forthcoming, 
2011). 
 30. Liz Robbins, Protesters Air Views on Government Spending at Tax Day Tea Parties 
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A16. 
 31. Id. 
 32. KATE ZERNIKE, BOILING MAD: INSIDE TEA PARTY AMERICA 83 (2010). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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a strategic memo, Tea Partiers should follow the lessons of Chicago-
based community organizer Saul Alinksy: “freeze it, attack it, personal-
ize it, and polarize it.”35 There were two objectives at these meetings: to 
challenge the Representative and to draw the audience’s attention to the 
fact that the Democratic leadership “is acting against our founders’ prin-
ciples.”36 Tea Partiers indeed attended these meetings in full force, often 
using disruptive tactics.37  
September 12, 2009, saw the largest round of Tea Party rallies yet. 
These were organized in large part by FreedomWorks, a libertarian orga-
nization that has aligned itself with the Tea Party, and Glenn Beck, who 
was launching what he called a “9–12” project.38 
In 2010, the Tea Party emerged a major force on the national politi-
cal scene. The year began with Scott Brown’s dramatic victory, on Janu-
ary 19, in the special election in Massachusetts to fill the senate seat of 
Edward Kennedy.39 Massachusetts showed the Tea Party’s ability to 
bring together grassroots activism and big-money support. The Brown 
victory foreshadowed the power of the Tea Party as a player in the mid-
term elections the following fall. In the coming months, Tea Party-
backed candidates would produce numerous upsets in the Republican 
primaries, and a number of them would go on to win in the November 
elections.40 
Although early critics of the Tea Party dismissed it as a an artificial 
movement, as “Astroturf,” as a movement with powerful backers but 
without real grassroots support, by 2010, the reality that this was a grass-
roots movement with widespread support became increasingly difficult 
to deny.41 Time magazine reported in February 2010: “Across the coun-
try, from Muskegon, Mich., to Wetumpka, Ala., Tea Party meetings are 
being convened in restaurants and living rooms and libraries and office 
buildings—and online. Tea Party thinking has inspired hundreds of web-
sites and Facebook pages.”42 By the spring of 2010, polls found almost 
one in five Americans identifying themselves as supporting the Tea 
Party, with four percent of the population saying they had given money 
to a Tea Party group or attended a Tea Party event.43 Exit polling at the 
November 2010 mid-term congressional elections found forty percent of 
  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 83–84. 
 37. Id. at 84–85. 
 38. See id. at 24–25, 85. 
 39. Id. at 88–92. 
 40. Alex Altman, Primary Round-Up: A Tea Party Triumph (Or Two) Is a Win For Dems, 
TIME, Sept. 15, 2010. 
 41. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 4. 
 42. David von Drehle, Why the Tea Party Movement Matters, TIME, Feb. 18, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1964903,00.html.  
 43. Kate Zernike & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More 
Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at A1 (summarizing a New York Times/CBS News poll). 
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those who cast their votes saying they were sympathetic to the Tea Party 
movement.44 The Tea Party closed 2010 by making the short list for Time 
magazine’s “Person of the Year.”45 
B. The Fundamentals of Tea Party Constitutionalism 
Attempting to make sense of the Tea Party is no easy task. Although 
there are a few national Tea Party-affiliated organizations,46 and a num-
ber of national figures who are identified with the movement,47 the Tea 
Party has been largely driven by local groups that have popped up around 
the country over the past two years.48 Because of its decentralized orga-
nization, under its umbrella is a diverse collection of interests and agen-
das. The Tea Party, like any broad-based social movement, contains 
many contradictions. Nonetheless, when one focuses on the Tea Party’s 
attitude toward the Constitution, a relatively coherent constitutional vi-
sion emerges. 
Tea Party constitutionalism revolves around four fundamental as-
sumptions. The first is that the solutions to the problems facing the 
United States today can be found in the words of the Constitution and the 
insights of its framers. The Founding period was a special moment, never 
to be replicated—the Founders were perhaps even divinely inspired. As 
Tea Party-backed candidate for U.S. Senate, Christine O’Donnell ex-
plained in a speech: “When our country’s on the wrong track, we search 
back to our first covenant, our founding documents, and the bold and 
inspired values on which they were based.”49 
The second fundamental assumption is that the meaning of the Con-
stitution and the lessons of history are readily accessible to American 
citizens who take the time to educate themselves. The Tea Party rejects 
hierarchical assumptions about authoritative constitutional interpretation 
in favor of more individualistic or community-based, decentralized ap-
  
 44. Fox Hannity (Fox News Network television broadcast Mar. 4, 2011).  
 45. David von Drehle, 2010 Time Person of the Year Runner-Up: Tea Party, TIME, Dec. 15, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036683_2037118_2037102,00.html; 
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domWorks. Various local groups, such as the Chicago-based Sam Adams Alliance, have gained a 
level of national prominence. The Tea Party Express, which is basically a conservative Republican 
fund-raising group that targets certain electoral races, has also gain considerable influence. And 
there are also various political action committees—such as the Koch-backed Americans for Prosper-
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 47. Glenn Beck is perhaps the most prominent single individual associated with the Tea Party. 
Other significant figures include Sarah Palin, Ron Paul, and Michelle Bachmann. See Lydia DePillis, 
The Tea Party Glossary: Everything You Need to Know About the Movement, From Nuts to Nuts, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2010, 11:50 PM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-tea-party-glossary. 
 48. The Rise of the Tea Party, THE WEEK (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:36 AM), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/106173/the-rise-of-the-tea-party.  
 49. Christine O’Donnell, Speech at the 2010 Values Voter Summit (Sept. 16, 2010), available 
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/17/christine-odonnell_n_721382.html.  
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proaches. Tea Party constitutionalism is premised on a commitment to 
citizen empowerment. “Because YOU are the Government” reads the 
motto of the Independence Caucus, a Utah-based group that has circu-
lated a list of questions designed to be given to potential candidates for 
public office that tests their commitment to conservative constitutional-
ism.50 A foundational premise of Tea Party constitutionalism is that indi-
vidual citizens can read the document for themselves, come to conclu-
sions about constitutional meaning based on this reading, and act upon 
these convictions. 
The corollary of this belief in the accessibility of the Constitution, 
and the third basic assumption of the Tea Party’s constitution vision, is a 
commitment to the idea that all Americans, not just lawyers and judges, 
have a responsibility to understand the Constitution and to act faithfully 
toward it. The Constitution is accessible. As Dick Armey, former House 
Majority leader and now Chairman of FreedomWorks, likes to tell audi-
ences: “If you don’t understand the Constitution, I’ll buy you a diction-
ary.”51 A popular Tea Party bumper sticker reads: “I have this crazy idea 
that the Constitution actually means something.”52 One of the most nota-
ble aspects of Tea Party constitutionalism is the relatively minor place 
the Tea Party allows for the courts in discussing constitutional issues. 
The preferred battleground for the Tea Party’s project of constitutional 
reconstruction is not the courts.53 Rather, the Tea Party has made its ef-
forts in the area of educational outreach, state-level political mobiliza-
tion, and national electoral politics. 
The fourth fundamental tenet of Tea Party constitutionalism in-
volves the movement’s substantive idea of what the Constitution actually 
means. At the heart of the Tea Party’s vision is a belief that the overarch-
ing purpose of the Constitution is to ensure that the role of government, 
and particularly the federal government, is limited. Only by following 
constitutionally defined constraints on government can individual liber-
ties be preserved. In the words of Tea Party favorite Senator Rand Paul 
of Kentucky, “belief in self-reliance, limited government and the Consti-
  
 50. INDEPENDENCE CAUCUS, http://www.ourcaucus.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).  
 51. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 67; see also ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, THE RULING CLASS: 
HOW THEY CORRUPTED AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 44 (2010) (all that is needed to 
understand the meaning of the Constitution is “the dictionary and grammar book”). 
 52. Political Bumper Stickers, LIBERTY STICKERS, http://www.libertystickers.com/product/ 
I_have_crazy_idea_the_constitution_MB (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
 53. The relative inattention to the courts reflects a general sense among Tea Party supporters 
that the Supreme Court is simply not on their side. See, e.g., CODEVILLA, supra note 50, at 42–43 
(attacking the courts as having a “[d]isregard for the text of laws, for the dictionary definition of 
words and the intentions of those who wrote them” and enforcing a “Constitution imagined by the 
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tution hold the keys to fixing our problems and getting our nation back 
on track.”54 
Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer neatly summarizes 
the assumptions underlying Tea Party constitutionalism: 
What originalism is to jurisprudence, constitutionalism is to gov-
ernance: a call for restraint rooted in constitutional text. Constitution-
alism as a political philosophy represents a reformed, self-regulating 
conservatism that bases its call for minimalist government—for rein-
ing in the willfulness of presidents and legislatures—in the words 
and meaning of the Constitution. . . . In choosing to focus on a majes-
tic document that bears both study and recitation, the reformed con-
servatism of the Obama era has found itself not just a symbol but an 
anchor.55 
Here are all the basic elements of the Tea Party’s constitutional vision: 
the Constitution as a framework for “minimalist government”; the Con-
stitution invites individual “study and recitation”; the Constitution’s 
“words and meaning” are self-evident; the Constitution as “an anchor” 
holding the nation fast to its founding principles.  
C. Constitutional Interpretation as Social Mobilization 
Tea Party constitutionalism has also coalesced around a particular 
method of constitutional interpretation, namely originalism.  This is a 
notable development because the most prominent arguments in defense 
of originalism have emphasized the ways in which it supposedly con-
strains judges. Originalism, this argument goes, relies upon tools of con-
stitutional analysis that are particularly suited to judges. It insulates 
judges from relying upon their own value judgments when interpreting 
the Constitution better than any other interpretive approach. Yet the ver-
sion of populist originalism that the Tea Party has embraced has de-
tached the case for originalism from concerns with judicial restraint.  For 
the Tea Party, originalism is a tool of extrajudicial constitutional mobili-
zation. 
Radio show host Mark Levin in his 2009 best-seller, Liberty and 
Tyranny, lays out the basic case for originalism as a tenet of movement 
conservatism: 
The Conservative is an originalist, for he believes that much like a 
contract, the Constitution sets forth certain terms and conditions for 
governing that hold the same meaning today as they did yesterday 
and should tomorrow. It connects one generation to the next by re-
straining the present generation from societal experimentation and 
  
 54. Rand Paul, Rand Paul, Libertarian? Not Quite, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2010, 6:13 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-08-10-column10_ST2_N.htm. 
 55. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed, Constitutionalism, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at A19. 
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government excess. There really is no other standard by which the 
Constitution can be interpreted without abandoning its underlying 
principles altogether.56  
In various forms, this basic defense of originalism as an act of national 
fidelity and a call to arms echoes throughout the Tea Party movement. 
The Constitution “meant one thing when it was written, and it still means 
the same thing,” declared a speaker at an April 2009 Tea Party rally in 
Athens, Texas.57 “It’s up to us to light a fire under our fellow citizens.”58 
Perhaps no major figure of the Tea Party has done more to insist 
that the Founders must be at the forefront of contemporary policy discus-
sions than Glenn Beck. “In order to restore our country,” he has said, 
“we have to restore the men who founded it on certain principles to the 
rightful place in our national psyche.”59 Beck has called for a “Refound-
ing.”60 The Beck-inspired “9–12 Project” has identified nine principles 
for its followers, each supported with a quotation from Jefferson or 
Washington.61 The group also calls on its followers to meet regularly 
with family and neighbors to discuss the importance of the Founders’ 
design for America.62 “When you read these guys [the Founders], it’s 
alive,” Beck once said on his show. “It’s like, you know, reading the 
scriptures. It’s like reading the Bible. It is alive today. And it only comes 
alive when you need it.”63  
This last point—that the Founders and the Constitution they drafted 
is “alive today”—is central to Tea Party ideology.64 For the Tea Party, 
the Founders’ ideas and personalities are present with us today. Their 
portraits, their words, even their modern avatars (in the form of historical 
re-enactors) are regularly found at Tea Party events. The Founders are 
also generally portrayed as comfortable companions. They are not only 
admirable and likable, but they also tend to agree with the Tea Party.65 
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Furthermore, the Founders, by most Tea Party accounts, were in basic 
agreement on the key points. The Founders were remarkable not only for 
the force of their ideas, but also for their general agreement upon these 
ideas. “One of the most amazing aspects of the American story,” wrote 
W. Cleon Skousen, the late ultra-conservative conspiracy theorist whose 
work has become widely influential in the Tea Party,66 “is that, while the 
nation’s Founders came from widely divergent backgrounds, their fun-
damental beliefs were virtually identical.”67 
Thus we can see in the Tea Party the transformation of originalism 
from a method of constitutional interpretation whose primary attribute 
was its claimed ability to limit judges into a method of constitutional 
interpretation that has become a focal point for a movement that has 
largely ignored the courts in promulgating its various constitutional 
claims.  Originalism in its populist form has become an act of respect, 
even reverence, for the Founding generation. Populist originalists em-
phasize the accessibility of Founding Era history, offering clear and con-
sistent answers to the most pressing dilemmas of modern America.  This 
may not be good history, but it offers a powerful tool for constitutional 
mobilization. 
D. The Process of Constitutional Mobilization 
One of the most important contributions of the Tea Party movement 
for scholars of popular constitutionalism is that it has demonstrated the 
viability of various extrajudicial mechanisms of popular constitutional 
claim-making.68 In this section, I examine the mechanisms by which the 
Tea Party has sought to inject its constitutional vision into popular con-
sciousness and political practice. I categorize these mechanisms into 
three categories: (1) the Tea Party’s promotion of its constitutional vision 
through educational outreach efforts; (2) state-level Tea Party activism, 
including lobbying for state “sovereignty” and nullification measures; 
and (3) national electoral politics, particularly the 2010 congressional 
elections, which provided the Tea Party a platform for pursuing its con-
stitutional vision through the electoral process. 
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1. Educational Outreach 
Premised on the idea that the Constitution is a document that is 
readily accessible to all Americans and a belief that higher levels of con-
stitutional consciousness will naturally support their cause, national and 
local Tea Party groups have sought to promote constitutional literacy 
among the citizenry. “We need to talk about and learn about the Consti-
tution daily,” said Jeff Luecke, a Tea Party organizer from Dubuque, 
Iowa, expressing a commonplace sentiment among the Tea Party faith-
ful.69 Glenn Beck regularly rails against the lack of schooling about the 
Constitution,70 and he has called on his listeners to act as a “constitu-
tional watchdog for America.”71 “Only citizens’ understanding of and 
commitment to law can possibly reverse the patent disregard for the 
Constitution and statutes that has permeated American life,” writes 
Angelo Codevilla, the author of a widely discussed recent populist con-
servative manifesto.72 One Tea Party-affiliated campaign—called “Save 
the Constitution—Read It!”—promotes a six-point constitutional com-
mitment plan:  
1. Commit to reading the Constitution today and reviewing it often. 
2. Make a goal and write it down.  
3. Mark your calendar to review the Constitution on the 17th of each 
month.  
4. Tell a friend about your goal.  
5. Better yet, read it with a friend.  
6. Place pocket Constitutions in your car or near your favorite 
chair.73 
The Tea Party Patriots sell an “Official Tea Party Patriots’ Coloring & 
Activity Book” for children.74 According to their website, “[i]nspired by 
the principles of Freedom and Liberty immortalized in the United States 
Constitution . . . the book includes a simple and fun emphasis on funda-
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mental freedoms and is part of a long term effort to educate the next gen-
eration of children on the basics of American liberty.”75 
Tea Party activists often compare their constitution classes to 
Catholic catechism76 or Bible study.77 They often proudly carry copies of 
the Constitution, and pocket copies are regularly distributed at Tea Party 
events.78 A group called Let Freedom Ring holds public readings of the 
Constitution,79 and some Tea Party groups have requested opportunities 
to go into schools to talk about the Constitution.80 
2. State-Level Constitutional Mobilization 
The second category of constitutional activity is state-level mobili-
zation. This has included campaigns to get state legislatures to pass “sov-
ereignty resolutions”—statements asserting a commitment to the princi-
ple of state sovereignty as recognized in the Tenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.81 Some states have even gone so far as to declare the right 
to nullify federal policy that the state legislature deems unconstitu-
tional.82 Another element of state-level constitutional activism is efforts 
to mobilize support for certain Tea Party-favored amendments to the 
Constitution.  
The mobilization of states’ rights ideology and even the possibility 
of state nullification of federal policy has been one of the most contro-
versial elements of the Tea Party’s constitutional project. The Tea 
Party’s embrace of these state-level projects of resistance to federal pol-
icy is significant not only because of the way they align with the move-
ment’s constitutional vision, but also because they provide an arena for 
constitutionally driven political mobilization that offers near-term, feasi-
ble targets, and the possibility of occasional victories. “We didn’t get 
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involved just to scream and shout; we actually have things that we’d like 
to accomplish,” explained a local Tea Party activist in Tennessee who 
came to his state’s capital to demand that the legislature attend to the Tea 
Party’s concerns.83 Even if these campaigns are often dismissed as 
merely symbolic, the states nonetheless provide a powerful forum for 
ongoing popular mobilization of the Tea Party’s constitutional agenda. 
The Tea Party’s promotion of state-level resistance to federal 
authority began in a rather haphazard, even farcical manner, but has 
since developed into a standard element of its larger constitutional pro-
ject. Texas governor Rick Perry gained headlines when, at a Tea Party 
rally in the spring of 2009, he went so far as to suggest secession as a 
possible remedy for an overreaching federal government.84 As talk of 
Texas seceding from the union died down, a basic pattern of Tea Party 
mobilization in the state legislatures developed. The first step was a 
round of generic “state sovereignty” resolutions. A popular model resolu-
tion has been promoted by the Tenth Amendment Center: the non-
binding “10th Amendment Resolution.”85 It includes some rather prosaic 
Tea Partyesque rhetoric—a statement that sovereignty resides in the peo-
ple, not the government; the text of the Tenth Amendment; a reference to 
unnamed federal “powers, too numerous to list for the purposes of this 
resolution, [which] . . . infringe on the sovereignty of the people of this 
state” and may be unconstitutional.86 It also includes some stronger lan-
guage—a demand that the federal government “cease and desist any and 
all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated pow-
ers”; a resolution to form a committee “to recommend and propose legis-
lation which would have the effect of nullifying specific federal laws and 
regulations”; a call for the creation of a “committee of correspondence” 
to rally support for these principles in other states.87 
The next step of the Tea Party’s state-level constitutional project 
has been the passage of state laws aimed at nullifying specific federal 
regulatory policies. The primary target here has been the health care law, 
although federal policies relating to the regulation of guns and medical 
marijuana have also been challenged through nullification resolutions. 
Even before passage of the federal health care bill in early 2010, local 
Tea Party groups were calling upon their state legislatures to take a stand 
against the looming possibility of a national health care program. A 
January 2010 rally in Missouri saw numerous state officials expressing 
support for an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting enforce-
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ment of the individual mandate.88 After the health care bill was signed 
into law, several states passed statutes expressing opposition to the law; 
some even went so far as to refuse to enforce the law.89 Virginia was the 
first to do so, passing its nullification law on March 4, 2010.90 At this 
time, thirty-six other states were considering similar legislation.91 These 
nullification resolutions were based on a template being circulated by the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), titled the “Freedom of 
Choice in Healthcare Act.”92 By the end of 2010, the model legislation 
had been introduced or announced in forty-two states; six states (Vir-
ginia, Idaho, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri), had passed ver-
sions of the bill; and two (Arizona and Oklahoma) had passed the bill as 
a constitutional amendment.93 In early 2011, Tennessee passed a law that 
would allow residents to choose to opt-out of the health care mandate.94 
When it comes to opposing the constitutionality of federal policy, 
nullification laws have obvious attractions from a movement mobiliza-
tion perspective. “Nullification Begins With You,” explains a Tenth 
Amendment Center brochure designed to promote its “Nullify Now 
Tour.”95  
Nullification is not something that requires any decision, statement or 
action from any branch of the federal government. Nullification is 
not the result of obtaining a favorable court ruling. 
. . . . 
Nullification is not the petitioning of the federal government to start 
doing or to stop doing anything. Nullification doesn’t depend on any 
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Federal law being repealed. Nullification does not require permission 
from any person or institution outside of one’s own State.96 
One of the constant challenges of constitutional mobilization is 
keeping a sense of purpose and forward momentum to the cause. Consti-
tutional change can be so slow, the realization of constitutional goals 
often seem impossibly distant. Lobbying state legislatures to stand up for 
their Tenth Amendment rights has proven a particularly effective way in 
which the Tea Party addressed this challenge. 
3. National Politics 
The third area of Tea Party constitutional activism I consider takes 
place in the arena of national electoral politics. The plan here is straight-
forward: to make fidelity to the Constitution a central qualification for 
elected office. The constitutional principle of limited federal power can 
be effectuated simply by demanding that members of Congress recognize 
their constitutional responsibilities—and voting them out of office if they 
fail to do so. One of the Tea Party’s goals was to transform the elections 
into a debate over the appropriate scope of congressional power under 
the Constitution. Thus far, it is here, in congressional politics, that the 
Tea Party’s constitutional agenda has had its most significant impact. 
“It is becoming apparent to millions of voters the solution lies in 
electing officials who understand, respect and abide by the Constitution 
as much as we citizens are expected to follow the law,” explained long-
time conservative fundraiser Richard Viguerie.97 FreedomWorks Chair-
man Dick Armey’s basic advice to the newly elected Tea Party-
supported members of Congress is quite simple:  
Look to the Constitution to govern your policy. You do not swear an 
oath to the Republican Party or the tea party—your pledge is to de-
fend the Constitution. Let this govern your votes. The Constitution 
was designed to limit government power, so make sure your votes go 
only to bills that are right and necessary.98 
The Independence Caucus, an organization that describes itself as a 
“national citizens organization” and has been aligned with local Tea 
Party groups, created a lengthy list of yes-or-no “vetting questions” for 
congressional candidates.99 It is basically a test of Tea Party bona fides, 
designed to measure a candidate’s commitment to the Independence 
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Caucus’s mission of promoting limited government, fiscal responsibility, 
and “adherence to constitutional authority.”100 
Mike Lee, newly elected U.S. Senator from Utah and a Tea Party 
favorite, has been quite explicit in talking about the constitutional com-
mitments he, as an elected representative, would feel compelled to fol-
low, regardless of existing judicial doctrine. In a speech to the Federalist 
Society in November 2010, soon after his election victory, Lee stated, 
that the solution to federal overreach lies in focusing on the political 
branches. Members of Congress must take more responsibility for the 
Constitution, he explained.  They must not forget the fact that  
under Article VI, each member of Congress is required to take an 
oath to uphold the Constitution. In my mind, that means more than 
doing that which you can get away with in court. . . . [M]embers of 
Congress need to be held accountable, and need to hold themselves 
accountable, to their oath, regardless of what the courts might be 
willing to enforce—that that needs to become part of the American 
political discourse.101 
When the new Republican House majority was installed in early 
2011, one of the most publicized changes was to require that all federal 
laws specify the constitutional basis for congressional authority.102 This 
was a proposal the Tea party had advocated during the 2010 elections.103 
The reason this requirement gained so much traction has much to do with 
a moment in the fall of 2009 during the height of the debate over the 
federal health care bill. At a press conference held by House Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi, a reporter from a conservative news organization asked the 
Speaker where in the Constitution she found the basis for the individual 
mandate provision of the health care bill.104 “Are you serious? Are you 
serious?” she asked.105 When the reporter responded in the affirmative, 
she shook her head and moved on to another questioner.106 This confron-
tation, and Pelosi’s dismissive attitude toward the question of the law’s 
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constitutionality, has been referenced again and again in Tea Party litera-
ture.107 It is regularly cited as clear evidence that the Democratic leader-
ship was playing fast and loose with the Constitution, ignoring conserva-
tive concerns that health care and other measures pushed beyond the 
boundaries of Congress’s constitutionally enumerated powers. 
The House Tea Party Caucus began a high-profile Constitution 
study group, not unlike the ones that have popped up around the nation 
with the encouragement of local Tea Party groups. Michelle Bachmann, 
U.S. Representative from Minnesota and founder of the Tea Party Cau-
cus, organized a series of what she called “Conservative Constitutional 
Seminars” for members of Congress.108 The class became a major news 
story before it even began, when Bachmann announced that Justice 
Scalia would lead the group’s first meeting.109 
There was also the highly publicized reading of the Constitution 
from the floor of the House of Representatives at the start of the term of 
the 112th Congress—the first time this had ever been done in the history 
of the House.110 Republican Congressman Bob Goodlatte of Virginia, a 
fiscal conservative and staunch opponent of the health care bill,111 initi-
ated the idea. “One of the resounding themes I have heard from my con-
stituents is that Congress should adhere to the Constitution and the finite 
list of powers it granted to the federal government,” he said in a press 
release.112 “As the written expression of the consent the American people 
gave to their government—a consent with restrictions and boundaries—
the public reading of the Constitution will set the tone for the 112th Con-
gress.”113 “Call it the tea party-ization of Congress,” Washington Post 
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reporters wrote about the newfound congressional fascination with the 
Constitution.114 “After handing out pocket-size Constitutions at rallies, 
after studying the document article by article and after demanding that 
Washington return to its founding principles, tea party activists have 
something new to applaud. A pillar of their grass-roots movement will 
become a staple in the bureaucracy that governs Congress.”115 
By turning to congressional elections and lawmaking as an arena of 
constitutional contestation, the Tea Party has found a way in which eve-
ryday citizens can stake out constitutional claims and then demand, in a 
relatively direct manner, that government abide by these constitutional 
principles. This approach to constitutionalism is far more empowering 
and far more effective as a tool of movement mobilization than working 
through the courts. Although critics often dismiss these Tea Party-
inspired episodes and reforms  as little more than publicity stunts, they 
have been effective at keeping the Tea Party’s constitution claims in the 
public eye. The Tea Party has achieved something considerable in creat-
ing a viable popular constitutional movement—a movement that has 
been able, for the most part, to avoid becoming dependent on the out-
comes of constitutional litigation but at the same time has had consider-
able success in keeping its agenda focused on the Constitution’s text and 
its history. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE TEA PARTY 
In its self-conscious commitment to extrajudicial constitutional in-
terpretation, the Tea Party offers one of the clearest demonstrations of 
the dynamics of popular constitutionalism in modern American history. 
This still-unfolding movement might offer valuable lessons about the 
capacities and limitations of popular constitutional mobilization.  
In this section, I will explore one possible lesson that emerges from 
the Tea Party case study. The hypothesis I will consider is that (1) popu-
lar constitutionalism is better suited to advancing certain kinds of consti-
tutional claims over others, and that (2) the Tea Party experience sug-
gests that popular constitutional mobilization can be particularly effec-
tive in advancing the small-government, anti-regulation agenda that is at 
the heart of the modern conservative-libertarian movement.  
In pursuing this hypothesis, I am challenging an assumption preva-
lent within popular constitutional scholarship. Scholarship on popular 
constitution has had something of a leftward tilt. Most of the most enthu-
siastic proponents of popular constitutionalism in the legal academy self-
identify as political liberals or progressives.116 They envision popular 
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engagement with the Constitution as an antidote to a Supreme Court that, 
for reasons having to do both with the ideological commitments of par-
ticular justices and the institutional constraints of the judiciary, has too 
often blocked progressive reforms favored by the elected branches and 
by popular movements.117 Popular constitutionalism is thus assumed to 
offer an attractive oppositional force to a Supreme Court that today and 
perhaps more generally (with the Warren Court as an aberrational mo-
ment) is basically a conservative institution. In treating popularly based 
constitutional commitments as oppositional to a conservative judiciary, 
popular constitutionalists assume that popular constitutional mobilization 
is well suited to the kinds of claims favored by progressives. Or, at 
minimum, they assume that popular constitutionalism provides ideologi-
cally neutral mechanisms through which all kinds of constitution 
claims—those favored by progressives as well as those favored by con-
servatives—can be advanced. The Tea Party experience raises the ques-
tion of whether unleashing the people themselves as autonomous claim-
ants on constitution meaning results in predictably progressive constitu-
tion claims. More provocatively, the Tea Party experience might suggest 
that popular constitutionalism could in fact have a rightward tilt. At least 
in the modern American scene, it would seem that those mechanisms that 
are most readily available for advancing extrajudicial constitutional 
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claims tend to serve conservative and libertarian interests better than 
progressive ones. What follows is a provisional effort to sketch some of 
the factors that could be drawn upon to evaluate this claim. 
A. The Conservative Constitution 
A central factor in considering the possible ideological tilt of popu-
lar constitutional mobilization is the nature of the Constitution itself.  
Most of the Constitution’s text is quite old. Although the Constitution 
can be read many ways, it is, first and foremost, a monument to a vision 
of governance from a past era. The “lessons” that can be easily extracted 
from this document, extracted without much intermediary direction (such 
as judicial doctrine), are not the kinds of lessons that tend to inspire those 
on the left today.  
“The Framers’ constitution, to a large degree, represented values we 
should abhor or at least reject today,” Michael Klarman stated in his 
2010 Constitution Day lecture.118 “The Constitution was drafted over 200 
years ago by people with very different concerns and values.”119 Not only 
is there the obvious point that the original Constitution actively sup-
ported the institution of slavery, but there is the point that “the Framers’ 
constitution was mostly a conservative, aristocratic response to what they 
perceived as the excesses of democracy that were overrunning the states 
during the 1780s.”120 The Framers were skeptical of democracy, Klarman 
emphasizes, and they were fully accepting of limiting the vote to white 
male property owners.121 Those provisions that would seem to prevent 
the government from doing what a majority of the people believe it 
should do are generally stretched or ignored. The idea of enumerated 
powers for Congress has largely been pushed aside; the administrative 
state is clearly problematic on separation of powers and nondelegation 
grounds, but it is here to stay; we now have an “imperial executive” that 
is a far cry from what the Founders envisioned for this office.122 “The 
Framers would not recognize our system of government today,” explains 
Klarman, “yet the idea that courts would strike it down as unconstitu-
tional seems almost inconceivable. The original design of the Constitu-
tion has become almost completely irrelevant.”123 
This kind of skepticism was the central theme of Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s controversial remarks on the document’s bicentennial: 
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever 
‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, fore-
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sight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly pro-
found. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective 
from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momen-
tous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional gov-
ernment, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, 
we hold as fundamental today. When contemporary Americans cite 
‘The Constitution,’ they invoke a concept that is vastly different from 
what the Framers barely began to construct two centuries ago.124 
It would be hard to find a description of constitutional development more 
at odds with the Tea Party movement than Marshall’s.  For Marshall, the 
Founding Fathers were deeply flawed men, as was the Constitution they 
created.  “[T]he true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution, but its 
life.”125   
What is important to note is that Marshall’s speech is that it was a call 
for a kind of constitutionalism, but it was a constitutionalism based in a 
skepticism toward the original document and the history surrounding the 
framing of the document.  It sought to demote the centrality of the text 
and of the late eighteenth century and to elevate the subsequent history of 
struggles to, in Jack Balkin’s phrase, “redeem” the Constitution.126  Not a 
miraculous moment in the summer of 1787, but subsequent struggles to 
overcome the limitations of the 1787 generation are at the heart of Mar-
shall’s constitutional vision and, more generally, contemporary progres-
sive constitutionalism. 
Justice Marshall had faith that his vision of the Constitution—a vi-
sion of the Constitution largely detached form its eighteenth century 
roots—aligned with that of “contemporary Americans.”  But, as demon-
strated in opinion polls showing considerable support for originalism and 
in the successes of the Tea Party in pushing an originalist conception of 
the Constitution, this assumption appears questionable, at least in today’s 
political environment. The case of the Tea Party indicates that, at least in 
the context of modern American political and constitutional culture, 
popular constitutionalism serves insurgent conservatism remarkably 
well. Most obviously, insisting, as the Tea Party has done, that the text 
and history of the Constitution play a role in debates over federal policy 
tends to provide added leverage to those who advocate more limited 
government. While resistance to federal regulatory authority can be 
found across the political spectrum (consider, for instance, the liberal-
libertarian alliance that briefly blocked renewal of the Patriot Act in early 
2011), it has been the centerpiece of the modern conservative agenda. As 
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a matter of popular constitutional mobilization, demanding that Congress 
do less (or that it repeal what it has already done) because of constraints 
based in constitutional text and history is a powerful weapon. The un-
avoidable fact that the federal regulatory state has grown immeasurably 
since the nation’s beginning means that the Founding Era contains plenty 
of material with which to challenge the proposed policy on originalist 
grounds. To insist that the Constitution be a central factor in the debate 
has tended to bolster the case of small-government opponents of new 
regulations more than its proponents. When it comes to political and so-
cial mobilization, the benefits of going constitutional, at least on the 
modern American scene, seem to favor the cause of small-government 
conservatism. 
B. Populist Conservative Constitutionalism—The Historical Record  
In using popular constitutional mobilization in the name of limiting 
the power of the federal government and mobilizing around states’ rights 
principles, the Tea Party locates itself into a venerable tradition dating 
back to at least to the period of the American Revolution. Considered 
historically, many of the most powerful expressions of popular constitu-
tionalism have been in the service of resistance to federal government 
authority. 
In delineating this intellectual history of popular constitutionalism, 
Kramer identifies the eighteenth-century Anglo-American concept of 
“fundamental law” as “law created by the people to regulate and restrain 
government, as opposed to ordinary law, which is law enacted by the 
government to regulate and restrain the people.”127 Kramer elaborates 
that “[t]he object of fundamental law was to regulate public officials, 
who were thus in the position of ordinary citizens with respect to it and 
required to do their best to ascertain its meaning while going about the 
daily business of governing.”128 In defending the newly drafted Constitu-
tion against Anti-Federalist charges that it created a national government 
that would devour the states, Federalists emphasized the ways in which 
the people could protect themselves against federal over-reach.129 In 
Federalist No. 46, James Madison famously recognized the importance 
of popular mobilization as a mechanism for resisting unconstitutional 
encroachments of federal authority.130 When faced with a federal law that 
transcends the limits of constitutional authority, states, Madison insisted, 
retained considerable ability to mobilize opposition:  
The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, re-
fusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the 
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executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by leg-
islative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, 
would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would 
form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sen-
timents of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would 
present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be 
willing to encounter. 
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the 
authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition 
of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of 
general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. 
A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be 
concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.131  
Many of the most conspicuous episodes of popular constitutional 
mobilization in American history have been aimed at standing up against 
federal power based on an originalist or fundamentalist reading of the 
Constitution.132 This was the case when Jefferson and Madison sought to 
mobilize opposition within the states to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 
1798.133 This was also the case in the lead-up to the Civil War, when the 
South argued that the Constitution protected slavery against federal inter-
ference, while abolitionists who refused to enforce federal fugitive slave 
laws also claimed to be acting on constitutional principle.134 
Moving into the twentieth century, we can see a similar pattern of 
social and political movements drawing on the text and history of the 
Constitution in order to protect against the growth of federal power. The 
Constitution became a powerful symbol of what was perceived to be a 
simpler and more principled time—it became, in essence, a rallying point 
for those who sought to slow the social and political changes of modern 
society. In his cultural history of the Constitution, A Machine that Would 
Go of Itself, historian Michael Kammen locates the first nationwide ef-
fort to mobilize the American people in order to specifically promote and 
defend the Constitution as taking shape in the 1910s and continuing 
through the 1930s.135 Like today’s Tea Party, this was a movement that 
was ideologically conservative, reacting against the trend toward the 
centralization of governmental power, increased federal regulations, and 
perceived encroachments by governing philosophies that were seen as 
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dangerous and radical.136 As a speaker at a 1934 Constitution Day cele-
bration proclaimed, the Constitution is “a bulwark against communism 
and Fascism.”137 Constitution Day—an observance initiated by various 
patriotic groups in the late 1910s—became a regular platform for denun-
ciations of Progressive and then New Deal policy.138 Like the Tea Party, 
this movement adopted a quasi-religious language to describe its efforts. 
It was a “constitutional revival” that was called for, explained Senator 
William E. Borah in 1924.139 This movement sought to increase popular 
understanding of the Constitution, sparking the creation of various orga-
nizations and citizens clubs, emphasizing constitutional fidelity as a par-
ticularly patriotic exercise.140 In the 1920s, members of constitutionalist 
groups such as the National Security League, the National Association 
for Constitutional Government, the Constitutional League were described 
as “Constitution Worshippers” and “Professional Patriots.”141 
In the 1950s and 1960s, white southerners opposed to civil rights 
also sought to energize popular engagement with the Constitution and the 
history of the Founding. In their efforts to oppose Brown v. Board of 
Education142 and the possibility of federally mandated school desegrega-
tion, southern segregationists took their stand on the Constitution. In 
1956 almost all southern members of Congress put their names on a 
statement, soon to be known as the “Southern Manifesto,” denouncing 
Brown as “unwarranted exercise of power by the Court, contrary to the 
Constitution.”143 
The Founding Fathers gave us a Constitution of checks and bal-
ances because they realized the inescapable lesson of history that no 
man or group of men can be safely entrusted with unlimited power. 
They framed this Constitution with its provisions for change by 
amendment in order to secure the fundamentals of government 
against the dangers of temporary popular passion or the personal 
predilections of public officeholders. 
We regard the decisions of the Supreme Court in the school cases 
as a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal 
Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of 
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and 
the people. 
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The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither 
does the 14th Amendment nor any other amendment.144  
The statement argued that the separate-but-equal principle, having 
been “restated time and again, [had become] a part of the life of the peo-
ple of many of the States and confirmed their habits, traditions, and way 
of life.”145 “We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the funda-
mental law of the land,” the southern members of Congress wrote in 
conclusion.146 “We decry the Supreme Court’s encroachment on the 
rights reserved to the States and to the people, contrary to established 
law, and to the Constitution.”147 Writing of the advocates of “massive 
resistance,” one contemporary observer noted: “In a sense they have be-
come ‘constitutional fundamentalists,’ trying to restore the true faith that 
is alleged to have been corrupted by modernism.”148  
Extrajudicial claims on the Constitution have been pursued for 
causes of all kinds.  Nonetheless, as these prominent examples suggest, 
efforts to inject constitutionalism into policy debate and to energize a 
social movement by highlighting constitutional principles and history 
have been particularly successful when pursued those promoting an 
agenda of anti-regulation, small government conservatism. 
C. Progressive Constitutionalism 
The current generation of liberals and progressives has sought to 
counter conservative claims on the Constitution’s meaning by offering 
their own vision of the Constitution. There are certainly textual bases that 
progressives can look to in staking their claims on the Constitution. The 
Tea Party reading of the Constitution tends to focus its energies on Arti-
cle I and the Bill of Rights (particularly the Tenth Amendment).  In con-
trast, a progressive reading of the Constitution tends to focus on what 
comes before and after those sections. The Preamble contains what is 
easily the most stirring and empowering rhetoric of the Constitution: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the United States of America.149 
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These words provide a powerful platform for claiming the need for 
more active government involvement in the lives of the American peo-
ple, all in the service of “establish[ing] Justice” and “promot[ing] the 
general Welfare” and “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty.”150 These 
principles, based in the Declaration of Independence as well as the Pre-
amble, are the essence of what Mark Tushnet calls the “thin Constitu-
tion”—the narrative of constitutional meaning that can function in the 
extrajudicial realm.151 
Rather than demonizing the state as conservative populist constitu-
tional tends to do, progressive constitutionalism, in both its judicial and 
extrajudicial forms, tends to embrace a positive vision of government 
power. This is a vision of federal power formulated, in tentative terms, 
during the period of Radical Reconstruction, then born anew through the 
struggles culminating in the New Deal and civil rights movement. It re-
jects the libertarian belief that liberty and power are invariably compet-
ing in a zero-sum game. Instead, progressives identify ways in which 
government authority can affirmatively act to protect rights. Government 
has the ability, perhaps even the constitutional responsibility, to uproot 
entrenched inequalities and ensure certain minimum benefits for its citi-
zens without which freedom is impossible.152 Progressive popular consti-
tutionalism occurs when people mobilize around a vision of human 
equality and social justice, and do so in the name of fundamental princi-
ples contained in our Constitution and embodied in the nation’s ongoing 
struggle to form a “more perfect union.”153 As Robin West has written, 
“Only by reconceptualizing the Constitution as a source of inspiration 
and guidance for legislation, rather than a superstructural constraint on 
adjudication, can we make good on its richly progressive promise.”154 
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William Forbath, one of the most powerful advocates of this consti-
tutional vision, has traced the development of what he calls the “social 
citizenship tradition.”155 In contrast to the more commonly recognized 
court-centered egalitarian tradition based on Brown and its progeny, the 
social citizenship tradition “was a majoritarian tradition, addressing its 
arguments to lawmakers and citizens, not to courts. Aimed against harsh 
class inequalities, it centered on decent work and livelihoods, social pro-
vision, and a measure of economic independence and democracy.”156 
Forbath explains, “In public political discourse, New Dealers cast the 
changes they sought as fundamental rights reinvigorating the Constitu-
tion’s promise of equal citizenship by reinterpreting it.”157 What Forbath 
calls the “political Constitution”—in contrast to the “judicial Constitu-
tion”—was debated in Congress, in the executive branch, and in the pub-
lic sphere, with the courts playing little role.158  
On the hustings, in radio addresses, and in more sustained debates, 
speeches, and writings, the lawmakers and the president argued not 
simply that Congress had the power under the Constitution, rightly 
understood or amended, to regulate agriculture, industry, and labor. 
They argued that citizens had fundamental economic and social 
rights under the Constitution, rightly understood or amended; and 
Congress, therefore, had the duty to exercise its power to govern eco-
nomic and social life in a way that sought to secure those rights. . . . 
[T]he “social citizenship” tradition . . . . provided them not only a 
rights rhetoric, but also a constitutional narrative, modes of interpre-
tation, and conceptions of the allocation of interpretive authority.159 
The central institution for institutionalizing this constitutional vi-
sion, what President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the “general Welfare 
Constitution,”160 was Congress. “[T]he New Dealers carried forward a 
long tradition of congressional constitutional argument, interpretation, 
rights recognition, and precedent-making.”161  
Not only do progressive legal scholars identify quite different sub-
stantive rights in the Constitution than do Tea Party constitutionalists, 
favoring most substantive visions of the equal protection principle and 
emphasizing the constitutional bases for active government involvement 
in advancing social welfare and justice, but the basic vision of the Con-
stitution they tend to advance is in direct opposition to the Tea Party’s 
vision of the Constitution. The Tea Party rallies around a vision of the 
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Constitution as fundamentally a source of limits on government author-
ity, as a bulwark against evolving standards of proper governance, as a 
way to keep the present-day Americans in touch with certain basic truths 
about liberty identified by a heroic generation of founding Americans. 
Progressive constitutionalists question each of these suppositions. They 
locate within the Constitution sources of government authority. They 
insist that constitutions have never been nor should they be static em-
bodiments of a single past moment. They note that there have been he-
roic struggles over constitutional principles since 1787 that should also 
be part of our constitutional self-understanding. This is a living, respon-
sive, democratic conception of constitutional development. “Constitu-
tional politics involves reinterpreting and revising our fundamental 
commitments and arriving anew at considered popular judgments about 
the rights of citizens and the duties of government,” Forbath explains.162 
While the progressive claims about the core meaning of the Consti-
tution are diametrically opposed to the Tea Party’s claims, there are in-
teresting parallels between the two constitutional projects. Indeed, in 
many ways they are mirror images of one another. Each challenges, in 
quite profound ways, the constitutional status quo. Each looks to past 
moments in American history as offering guidance for achieving their 
constitutional vision. Each sees the courts as basically antagonistic to 
their constitutional vision. Each takes seriously the value of extrajudicial 
constitutional engagement and interpretation. Each identifies Congress in 
particular as the institutional focal point for their constitutional projects. 
Thus we can see a good deal of overlap between Tea Party constitution-
alism and modern progressive constitutionalism, both in terms of tactics 
of constitutional mobilization and assumptions about the construction of 
constitutional meaning. Both take seriously the constitutional responsi-
bilities of Congress. Both recognize that members of Congress have an 
obligation to interpret the Constitution, without being necessarily con-
strained by judicial interpretation. 
In response to the Tea Party’s war for the Constitution, progressive 
legal scholars have fought back. Much of the counter-offensive has come 
in the form of taking issue with the Tea Party’s reading of the Constitu-
tion and claims about its history.163 “The Constitution belongs to all of 
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us,” writes Garrett Epps.164 “It’s time to take it back from those who are 
trying to steal it in plain sight.”165 Epps is critical of liberals for being 
unable or unwilling to deal with the Constitution in terms that resonate 
with the American people. “Scholars from top schools hold forth with 
polysyllabic theories of hermeneutics that ordinary citizens can’t 
fathom.”166 Conservatives, on the other hand, “don’t hesitate to speak 
directly to the public and, often, to dumb down the Constitution.”167 Yet, 
Epps contends that the Constitution is not a conservative document. He 
finds “precious little evidence” that the Constitution “was set up to re-
strain the federal government.”168 “[T]he document as a whole is much 
more concerned with what the government can do—not with what it 
can’t. . . . [T]he Constitution allowed for a government adequate to the 
challenges facing a modern nation.”169 Those limits on government 
power that the Constitution does include, he argues “are mostly limits on 
state governments and corresponding increases in federal power.”170 By 
Epps’ reckoning, “a careful reading of the Constitution” shows that the 
framers “wrote a document that in essence says, ‘Work it out.’”171 
Epps proposes to fight the Tea Party on their own terms. “To save 
our Constitution, we have to read it”—something he believes few people 
take the time to do.172 He even becomes something of a cheerleader for 
the document and the experience of reading it:  
The Constitution as a whole takes effort to read; but once one puts in 
the effort—several readings, all the way through, and some serious 
thought about what one has read—it reveals a surprising, indeed 
sometimes dazzling, array of meanings. By turns political, legal, epic 
and poetic, it shows us a number of strategies for dealing with con-
temporary challenges. 
. . . .  
At its most basic level, reading the Constitution requires the tools 
that Vladimir Nabokov urged readers to bring to any text: imagina-
tion, memory, a dictionary and a willingness to use all three when the 
going gets tough.173 
And he concludes his attack on the Tea Party with a call to arms: 
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Read the Constitution and measure it against the absurd claims we 
hear every day. This is a matter of life and death for our Republic. 
We won’t find the Tea Party manifesto there; nor will we find the 
agenda of progressive advocacy groups. What we will find is a set of 
political tools and a language that fair-minded citizens, progressive or 
conservative, can use to talk through our disagreements. 
. . . . 
Ordinary Americans love the Constitution at least as much as far-
right ideologues. It's our Constitution too. 
It’s time to take it back.174 
The question for progressives like Epps who put their hopes in 
popular constitutional engagement is whether the principles of the thin 
Constitution can be effectively mobilized.  Whether accurate or not, his 
description of the revelations to be found in the Constitution is hardly the 
kind of call to arms offered by the Tea Party.  The only clear message 
Epps pulls from the text of the Constitution is that the Tea Party is wrong 
in its reading of the Constitution.  But the best alternative he has for the 
Tea Party’s libertarian constitutional vision is a call for talk. “Work it 
out” is hardly a rallying cry for a constitutional movement. 
CONCLUSION 
The question is, then, are certain constitutional arguments more sus-
tainable in a popular arena? More specifically, is popular constitutional-
ism more effective—at least in our contemporary political climate—at 
advancing a conservative-libertarian agenda than a progressive one? The 
experience of the Tea Party suggests that this might very well be the 
case. One of the central issues that scholars of popular constitutionalism 
are going to have to assess in the wake of the emergence of the Tea Party 
is whether popular constitutionalism has an ideological tilt.  This ques-
tion has not been a central focus in scholarship on popular constitutional-
ism, but it deserves to be. 
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